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On the Moral Significance of sacrifice
By J Raz
The paper offers a few reflections on moral implications of making sacrifices and of possible
duties to make sacrifices. It does not provide an exhaustive or a systematic account of the
subject. There are too many disparate questions, and too many distant perspectives from
which to examine them to allow for a systematic let alone an exhaustive account, and too
many factual issues that I am not aware of. Needless to say, the observations that follow are
in part stimulated by the popularity of some views that are mistaken. I will not however
examine any specific view or account of these matters. The aim is to provide some pointers
that will be helpful when considering specific issues regarding the moral significance of
sacrifice.
1.
I take ‘making a sacrifice’ to mean knowingly giving up something, of such value to the agent
that foregoing it would be deprivation or a hardship, for the sake of something or someone
that one values, other than oneself or one's interests. In the long run, a sacrifice could turn
out to enhance one's interests etc., but if it was done in order to enhance one’s interests, it
would not be a sacrifice[so long as was not done in order to do so]. Benefits from a
sacrifice can of course happen accidentally or unforeseeably. But they can be foreseeable. I
may make a sacrifice in order to save my child’s life, and his life’s eventual richness and
happiness may greatly enrich my life. So long as in no way did I do it in order to avoid a
disaster for my life it was a sacrifice. Needless to say, as with anything that depends on the
agent’s intention, there will be many cases regarding which it will be hard or impossible to
determine whether they involve a sacrifice or not. What is clear is that a gift or any selfdeprivation undertaken in order to be given an honour or a benefit is not a sacrifice even if
the benefit does not come – it was just a bad deal.
My interest is in the moral significance of making a great sacrifice. Needless to say, sacrifices
may take many different shapes and forms, and also be of different degrees. So I will use ‘a
great sacrifice’ stipulatively to include ones that seriously and permanently impair one’s
health or render one seriously disabled, and those that prevent one from carrying on with
the life one has. By ‘the life one has’ I mean the sort of life one is embarked on, where that
1
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sort is identified by the features that are of central importance to the person whose life it is:
so, if both Abe and Bob are hospital nurses, it could be that being a nurse is (part of) the life
of one of them and not of the other, if one of them cherishes being a nurse whereas the
other does not care about it in any way other than as a source of income. I will not discuss
the sacrifice or the giving up of one’s life, even though it is commonly thought to be the
supreme sacrifice. I believe with Epicurus that death is nothing to us, that is, nothing to the
person who is dying, or at least that that is generally the case. Therefore, generally giving up
one’s life is a sacrifice only when it is a hardship or deprivation for people or causes dear to
the person who is giving up his life. Given that this is not the occasion to consider this view
about the value of staying alive1, I will avoid discussing this kind of sacrifice.
Sacrifices can be or fail to be virtuous, obligatory, something one has reason to do, and
much else. To simplify matters I will often refer to them as being or not being moral
requirements. I use the term to fudge the question of the precise moral status involved.
Saying something like: if a great sacrifice is morally required it has one of the possible moral
statuses[?] namely it is virtuous, obligatory, supererogatory, etc., and it does not matter for
current purposes which status it has.
From the point of view of individuals involved there is a big difference between actions that
risk ending up with a large sacrifice for the agent, e.g. loss of limb or being kidnapped, and
actions that essentially involve making a sacrifice, such as resigning an irreplaceable job, or
where the sacrifice is a virtually certain side effect of the action intended. Where there is a
known significant risk of a sacrifice which does not materialise no sacrifice occurred, though
the agent was ready and willing to make a sacrifice. Where there was a known risk and the
risk materialised, so that the agent suffered a significant loss and hardship we do correctly
say that the agent made a big sacrifice. In spite of the considerable difference between the
different cases much of the time I will lump them together. This is not to deny the
importance of the felt differences for agents, and the consequential policy differences when
designing or controlling circumstances that call for sacrifices. Yes, it is preferable to ask
people to run the risk of a sacrifice than to make a sacrifice outright, etc. But much of the
time the differences would not matter to the discussion of the paper.
2.
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I argued for it in Chapter 3 of Value, Respect and Attachments.
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Generally speaking, making a sacrifice is not in itself morally significant. Of course, we
sometime refer to sacrifices made as an indication of how much one values the cause or
person. But this is just an instance of the general way of assessing how much one cares or
values something by how much one is willing to do to secure it or to avoid losing it etc. As
one among several indicators it serves well, but there is nothing special in mentioning a
sacrifice in that way.
Is it wrong to make some sacrifices? Yes, but that is not specific to sacrifices either. It is
wrong to make silly sacrifices or badly judged ones, or those that are irresponsible towards
oneself or another (one's child).
Is the making of a justified, well-judged sacrifice saintly? Not necessarily; not even if it was
one's duty to make the sacrifice, and not even if one made it for the right reasons, say
abandoning one’s career and moving to another town to look after an aged parent, when
there is no satisfactory alternative. One may resent having to make the sacrifice, hate the
parent whose need made it necessary, hate oneself for not being able to do better, etc. And
in such cases there is nothing saintly about the sacrifice.2
The manner in which one makes the sacrifice and the web of beliefs and attitudes
surrounding it determine what it implies regarding one’s moral dispositions and one’s moral
character. But that is so for any of one’s actions and omissions. Again, there is nothing
special about sacrifice here. But is not the making of a sacrifice necessary for the action to
be anything like saintly? This question requires a broad ranging examination of the degree to
which and the ways in which acts, activities and omissions reflect on or manifest established
dispositions and character traits. It cannot be undertaken here. I for one do not think that
even extreme moral virtue can only be manifested by making a sacrifice. But I will not argue
for that view here.
3.
Is one ever morally required to make a sacrifice, or to make a serious sacrifice, say to
sacrifice the life one has?
Clearly, common opinion allows that sacrificing the life one has can be one’s moral duty.
After all, common opinion has it that people have a moral duty to volunteer for military
service under certain circumstances, even though doing so regularly forces people to
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I am not referring to cases in which one overcomes negative attitudes of this kind, but rather to occasions in which one succ umbs to
them in thought and feelings.
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abandon the life they have, without a secure prospect of being able to resume them later
on.
I mentioned that the very act of joining the armed forces is often a major sacrifice. Needless
to say, in the course of serving in the armed forces one may be required to sacrifice health,
limbs, or life. The same is true of people who join the armed services without conscription,
or extend their membership after conscription, as well as of police officers, fire brigade
officers, and some others.
These are instructive illustrations for several reasons. First, analogical reasoning relying on
some such cases makes a plausible case for there being a moral duty to make serious
sacrifices in some cases. In many of these cases, the moral duty follows the imposition of a
legal duty. That is, there are circumstances where there is no moral duty to join the armed
forces except that once there is such a legal duty, that becomes also a moral duty. In other
cases, there is a moral duty to do something, even if it involves making serious sacrifice, a
duty that is independent of any legal or other institutional duty. But let us consider first the
cases where a legal or institutional duty comes first.
First, to clarify the obvious: It is not my contention that whatever the law requires becomes,
as a result, a moral duty; only that sometimes this is the case. Second, there is no denying
that sometimes when the law’s requirements involve making serious sacrifices, that very fact
engenders resentment and grudging obedience, as well as a tendency to evade or simply
break the law. But often enough it does not. Rather, most people join in the belief that the
requirement is justified, being a civic duty or something of the kind. They know that life
involves duties to others, and duties to the community, and that they personally bear their
share of the burden of such duties. I do not mention these facts to suggest that these
attitudes are self-verifying, that people have these duties because they believe that they have
them. My sole point is that these facts remind us that the thought that morality cannot
require serious sacrifices because making them is more than can be expected of ordinary
human beings, that making them without resentment, or making them at all, can be
expected only of saintly people, is simply empirically false.
It seems not too difficult to understand how the making of sacrifices can become part of the
fabric of life. Here is part of the story: In principle we all know or can know when sacrifices
will be expected of us. We know that if a fire breaks out in the next door building we may
have to run into a burning building to try to save trapped people. But we don’t know if and
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when such a fire will break out. One difference with conscription, when it is part of the
regular law so that all people who meet certain conditions are liable to a predefined period
of conscription when they reach a certain age, is that people know or can know of the
sacrifice expected of them years ahead of time. A second difference is that while the
folklore of heroism and sacrifice typically concerns individuals acting singly or in small
groups (though not always: remember the Battle of Thermopylae) conscription and other
legally required sacrifices affect large segments of the population, selected or determined in
a fair way (at east they could be so determined. A third important difference is that the legal
requirements are, as we say, backed by sanctions, formal and informal.
The sanctions make it easier for people to make the required sacrifices, and this for at least
two reasons. First, they can see or come to believe that they have no choice, the sanctions,
formal such as fines or community service or imprisonment, and the informal ones, loss of
reputation, adverse social reactions, loss of face, not to say loss of one’s job, etc. ., mean
that in many of these cases one has, or feels one has no choice but to make the required
sacrifice. Besides, the fact that the requirement is enforced, as we say, by law, assures
people that they are not taken advantage of by shirkers who benefit from their sacrifices,
while not sacrificing anything themselves. The law, when functioning properly, solves the
assurance problem, making it psychologically easier for people to carry the burdens allotted
to them.
The fact that conscription and other legally enforced sacrifices apply to large sections of the
population also makes sacrifice easier, as it is easier to act as part of a similarly oriented
body of people. One derives strength and support from sharing the conditions one is in with
others. The advantages of the first difference are also obvious. Knowing in advance of the
sacrifice and its general character makes it possible to take it into account when thinking
about and planning one’s future. It may even enable one to change its character as a
sacrifice. For example, one may decide on a military career. As a result the period during
which one is conscripted is no longer a sacrifice of the life one has. It becomes the life one
has. Many people find less dramatic solutions: while their time in the armed services is a
disruption of their normal life as it was and as it will be, they try to use the time in the
military to acquire some skills that interest them for their own sake, or for future use, etc.
Even when no such avenue to lessen the sacrifice are available, it is easier to bear when its
place in one’s life is predictable.
4.
5

Could it be that one may be morally required to make big sacrifices only if there is a legal or
other institutional requirement to that effect? One reason to doubt this possibility is that so
far as the three differences listed above are concerned, the differences they mark are a
matter of degree. Almost universally people’s moral views are shared among large groups.
So that whether or not they are institutionally enshrined they are known and understood by
whole groups of people, thus having a public definition even when they are not legally
defined. That definition eases the burden of decisions when is a sacrifice required, and mean
that people’s conduct in making required sacrifices is socially supported, and failure to make
them is socially disapproved. Without denying that conditions are different when the moral
duties are legally enshrined, one has to admit that there are many similarities between the
social recognition and the legal recognition of moral duties, similarities that make
compliance with those duties easier for individuals, partly by enabling them to incorporate
the duties into the parts of their lives that provide meaning and a sense of fulfilment, and
partly by providing a background of support for compliance and pressure against violations
of moral requirements.
That great sacrifice is sometimes morally required leaves open the possibility that it cannot
be something one has a strict duty to do, or that if there is a strict duty to make a great
sacrifice, failure to fulfil that duty is excusable, and if not altogether excusable then at least
any blame attached to the failure is mitigated by the fact that it is a failure to make a great
sacrifice. Various considerations can tempt people into such views. One of them relies on
some thoughts about the relations between motivation and sacrifice. But what thoughts?
One assumption is that there is a reverse correlation between degree of sacrifice and
degree of motivation: the greater a sacrifice the less willing is one to make it. It can be given
a form which makes it close to true. For example, it may be taken to say that if one can
achieve a goal one is set on either by doing A or by doing B, and the agent believes that the
only difference between them is that A involves a smaller sacrifice on his part than B then
the agent will choose to realise his goal by doing A rather than by doing B. Most of the time
agents will have that preference, but not always. Sometimes an agent will pursue his goal by
doing B because (a) that will enable him to feel more confident that he has done all he could
have done, or because (b) he would feel that his (greater) sacrifice would expiate his guilt
for being in a condition where he has to pursue that goal, etc. Sometimes the failure of the
assumption may be attributable to an irrationality in the agent (as perhaps in case (a) above),
but that is not always so (a sense of expiation through sacrifice is not necessarily irrational).
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Once we develop the assumption to make it true it turns out to be nothing more than (a
direct derivation from) the truism that there is no case for incurring greater disadvantages
than would likely suffice to secure one’s goal. It does not tell us anything about the
connection between sacrifice and motivation.
What some people have in mind is (among other variants on this thought) something like
this: suppose that people who are C have a duty to achieve goal G. Doing so may require
different things of those people. Some of them could achieve the goal only if they make a
great sacrifice. But normally people cannot be expected to make great sacrifices. Human
nature is such that one can rarely and/or with great difficulty be motivated to make a great
sacrifice. Therefore, either that moral duty does not apply to them, or they are excused if
they do not fulfil it, etc. However, many of the earlier reflections aimed to show that that
assumption, that view of the connection between great sacrifice and motivation is mistaken.
Hence the questions about the scope of moral duties, and the grounds for excuses are not
affected by such views about sacrifice.
We need to understand when is the making of great sacrifices particularly difficult to
motivate. It is likely that what makes great sacrifices difficult also makes compliance with
moral duties in other cases difficult. Not surprisingly, it turns out that many factors affect
the motivation to comply with moral requirements. We gain some understanding of their
nature by examining the conditions, like those surveyed above, which help with complying
with demanding moral duties: the ability to predict when one may encounter them, and to
find ways of integrating them into one’s life; the support one gains from the common
opinion of one’s community, and of course of one’s friends, etc. The absence of such factors
creates the emotional, and therefore the motivational difficulty of facing up to one’s
obligations. These, however, are the conditions of a wholesome life in general: if one is at
peace with oneself one can find that complying with moral requirements enables one to
affirm one’s sense of self-respect and self-worth. Being consumed with self-doubt, selfloathing, or guilt makes one more conflicted, more inclined to self-destructive behaviour
including immoral conduct (or what one takes to be immoral). Being at odds with the
society one lives in breeds alienation, and negative-destructive attitudes, and drives one to
extremes of defiance or of capitulation to demands that are not understood, and
compliance with which increases the negative attitudes rather than infusing one with a sense
that one’s life has a meaning. One can go on and detail the conditions that best sustain
moral life – “best sustain” because there is no suggestion here that one cannot lead a
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morally exemplary life without them – however, there is no point in adding details. The
general picture is fairly clear. The moral life is best sustained when moral requirements and
people’s attitudes towards them are integrated in what I will call a broadly understood
support network of psychological and social factors encompassing all other aspects of life. It
is a mistake to try to understand moral attitudes and moral life as an autonomous sphere,
detached from all the rest.
One has to be lucky to find oneself at home in oneself and to be in a society that is moral
and to which one feels an unconflicted sense of belonging. Saying that is no more than saying
that the moral life is a social life, and that one is not assured of living in conditions that
support both wholesomeness and morality. Of course, even the best support networks
leave one struggling with oneself on occasion. There are no conditions, however perfect, in
which one can avoid solitary struggle with one’s conscience and emotions. these struggles
may be occasioned when facing the demand to make a sacrifice, but they are as or more
likely to occur when confronting misfortunes that, as it were, inflict sacrifices (losses that
would have been sacrifices had they been the results of one’s intentional action), or other
circumstances that cast the success and direction of one’s life in doubt.
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